Tuesday, March 4, 2008

The Entitlement Theory by Robert Nozick

My overall interpretation of Rawls' arguments, as elaborated in the theory of the principle of justice and the social contract, are that he rejects the first two principles of justice (for valid reasons) and adds a new, "contractarian alternative," that utilizes the best and fairer virtues of the other two. He also outlines how all three interpretations can be imposed by formulating two basic premises:

1. Each person engaged in an institution or affected by it has an equal right to the most
extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all;
2. Inequalities as defined by the institutional structure or fostered by it are arbitrary unless
it is reasonable to expect that they will work out to everyone's advantage and provided that
the positions and offices to which they attach or from which they may be gained are opened to
all.

A valid argument. Except the problems I found with his argument is that the constitution that was created (at least in the United States), if it follows his beliefs, did not reject the first two principles but included them (to a point). What it rejected was the lower classes of society, the poor, blacks and native Americans). How is that so? How can a just institution be created when half of the people affected by it are left out of the decision-making process?

Also, Rawls' argues that the competitive structures must be in place and also must be decided by this group. Again, we have already seen that human nature dictates that man, if given an opportunity, will create the greatest good for himself first, and receive the largest share of what he creates for himself-first. If we go back to Carnegie's view, only the wealthiest of this society were allowed to make the decisions about how wealth in general and their wealth in particular would be distributed.

I conclusively rejected Rawls' arguments outright based on the fact that distributive laws were never created in a just way, nor have they been carried out with an equality of distribution or in a just way. They are not designed to be fair and equal.

However, Nozick, on the other hand, argued that the less distributive justice interfered with the affairs of the people, the better off they would be. In my time, I have seen the advantages and disadvantages of both arguments. Yet, I feel Nozick's arguments were more realistic.

Robert Nozick, a philosophy professor from Harvard University wrote: "The minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified and the term 'distributive justice' is not a neutral one ." After further researching these statements, I came to understand the interpretation as meaning that the least amount of charitable distribution in the lives of its people, the better for the people, overall (232). People hold biased views. Those bias creep into everything they do. Therefore, those biases will always affect the distributive justice (subjective as it may seem) of who gets what in this society. I also came to understand that he actually wrote this piece to provide a counter argument to the claims made by Rawl's.

Nozick goes on to state: "There is no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out. What each person gets, he gets from others who give him in exchange for something, or as a gift. In a free society, diverse persons control different resources, and new holding arise out of the voluntary exchange and actions of persons. There is no more a distribution or distribution of shares than there is a distribution of mates in a society in which persons choose whom they shall marry (Nozick 232)

The Entitlement Theory

Nozick outlines how the argument by Rawls could be just by stating that if the institution is just (in its original making), then, everything that arises from it would therefore be just (or at least apear to be all-inclusive). His theory of justice is more realistic and is outlined as follows:

"If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings.

1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is
entitled to that holding

This, to me means, when the settlers came to America, had they negotiated with the native indieans who were already on this land, and acquired the land they became so rich from in a just and fair way, then the land would belong to them. If not, the land belongs to the native Americans, not to people like Carnegie.

2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to that holding, is entitled to the holding.

This means that if the person who gave them the land (in this case, the land was taken by force and not equally transferred), the land then was transferred according to the principle of justice. If an employer gives you a job, this is not entitlement, you work and earn your keep. If the employer pays you less than you are worth, does that mean the employer is entitled to his share?

3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2.

Herein lies the justice. If the above arguments are true, then our entire existence is a fallacy. We have based everything we do on a diverse set of circumstances that were not created by the equal inclusiveness of everyone affected by the outcomes.

Therefore, I cannot accept Rawls argument of distributive justice on the basis that the distribution was never just. Unfortunately, the people who created the current capitalistic environment from which we operate today, never had a chance to take Professor Silver's class.

In full agreement with Nozick's summation, I too believe that:

"The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution (233)."

Neither Carnegie or any other wealthy individual(s) of his time actually acquired their wealth in the ways outlined here. Therefore, whose to say that their method of distributing their wealth after death (charities, gifts, taxes, their families, etc.) is just? I would go on and surmise that the real basis for distributing wealth in the ways that they chose, outside of inheritance, was simply to ensure that their names would continue to be recognized throughtout history and not because they cared so much about making sure that the lowest amongst us would benefit from it.

If given a choice, I suppose the lowest amongst us would have rather had the money then, to use for food, clothing, housing and perhaps a nice thick steak on the table during Carnegie's lifetime, not after he died when they too, were probably dead.

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